THE VIRTUE OF PLAYFULNESS:
WHY HAPPY PEOPLE ARE PLAYFUL

boomer trujillo (glenn.trujillo@louisville.edu)
APA Pacific, San Francisco, 18 April 2025

with comments from: Brennan McDavid and Lucy Vollbrecht

1) ARISTOTLE ON PLAY

Aristotle talks a lot about play and leisure.

A (THE?) KEY PASSAGE

Nicomachean Ethics, Book X, Sec. 6, trans. Christopher Rowe (Underline added for emphasis.)

“But the ones [activities] desirable in themselves are those from which nothing is sought over and above the activity. Actions in accordance with excellence [virtue] are thought to be of this kind, on the basis that doing what is fine and worthwhile is one of the things desirable because of themselves. Also thought to be of this kind are the pleasant forms of amusement [play], since people do not choose them because of other things; after all, they get harm rather than benefit from them, by not taking care of their bodies and their property. But such diversions [amusement/play] are the refuge of most of those called ‘happy’, which is why people who have the supple wit for such diversions are in good standing with tyrants; they make themselves pleasant in ways that fit what the tyrant seeks, and he needs people like that. It is thought, then, that these things make for happiness because those with political power spend their leisure-time on them ... But presumably people like that are no indication of anything, since excellence [virtue] does not lie in wielding power, and neither does intelligence, from which the worthwhile activities flow. Nor if these people who have had no taste of refined and civilized pleasure resort to bodily ones should one think because of this that the latter are more desirable, since children too think best what is most honored among their own group. It is to be expected, then, that just as different things appear honorable to children and grown men, so too with bad characters and good ones. So as has often been said, both what is honorable and what is pleasant is what is so for the good person; but for each type, the most desirable activity is the one that accords with his own proper disposition. For the good person as well, therefore, the most desirable [activity] is the one that accords with excellence [virtue]. In that case, happiness does not lie in amusement [play]; for it is indeed a strange thought that the end [goal] should be amusement [play], and that the busyness and suffering throughout one’s life should be for the sake of amusing oneself [playing]. For we value almost everything, except happiness, for the sake of something else; for happiness is an end [goal]. To apply oneself to serious things, and to labor, for the sake of amusement [play] appears silly and excessively childish. ‘Play to be serious,’ as Anacharsis has it, seems the correct way. For amusement [play] is like relaxation, and it is because people are incapable of laboring continuously that they need to relax. Relaxation then, is not an end [goal]; for it occurs for the sake of activity. The happy life seems to be in accordance with excellence; and this life is one accompanied by seriousness, not one that depends on amusement [play]. Again, we say that serious things are better than those that occasion laughter and involve amusement [play], and that the activity of what is better, whether part of a human being or the whole of one, is more serious; but the activity of what is better is superior, which already implies that it is more productive of happiness. Again, just anyone can enjoy bodily pleasures, and a slave no less than the best kind of person, but no one thinks of a slave as having a share in happiness, unless he also has a share in life. For happiness does not lie in diversions of this sort, but in the kinds of activity that accord with excellence, as has been said before.”

ARISTOTLE’S TAKE

  1. AUTOTELICITY: some activities have their telos (end/goal) in themselves (autos) [vs. instrumental]

    1. Virtue is taken as the obvious example of autotelic. But so is PLAY, presumably (translating paidiē, which also gets translatd as “amusement”). Primary evidence: not only to people do them for their own sake; they’ll sacrifice health and money too!

  2. PLAY VALUED WIDELY: The happiest people spend a lot of time playing, even tyrants do! .. But who cares? We only care about opinions of good people!

  3. PUZZLE: Play is inextricable from the lives of happy people. But does happiness itself consist in play?

    1. No! We bleed, sweat, and cry for our leisure time. So, whatever we do there should indicate something about our values. It would be super weird if play is all we spent that time on. Play to work hard! (Don’t work hard to play.)

  4. A VERY ARISTOTELIAN CONCLUSION: Now that I’ve told you you’re wrong about play, it’s all about virtue.

MY INTEREST

  1. Aristotle felt play and leisure crucial to talk about here. Also in Politics, where he repeats three times that war is only done for the sake of peace, and work is done only for the sake of leisure.

  2. Aristotle acknowledges that play is IMPORTANT, but not the most important

  3. Good people seem to be the measure of all things, including play. Seems an empirical claim about how play figures into the good life. (Necessary cointantiation, contingent coinstantiation, necessary for virtue, sufficient for virtue, unnecessary)

Aristotle makes all of these remarks? Why doesn’t he just talk about it in terms of virtues like he does everything else?

2) MY THEORY OF PLAYFULNESS

Short Explanation of Playfulness

“In neo-Aristotelian fashion, I tie the virtue of playfulness to a sphere of life: leisure. By ‘leisure,’ I almost always mean leisure time, the time that we have that serves no direct somatic, economic, or otherwise necessary goal; the time that we have to be free and choose what we do for its own sake. And I argue that playfulness helps us to use our leisure time to rest, develop ourselves, and engage our communities” (emphasis original, p. 6).

Neo-Aristotelian Ethics on Steroids

Neo-Aristotelian / Aristotelian Pattern

“The Temple of Playfulness” drawn by kelelowor

Outline of Playfulness

  • Play as an action vs. PLAYFULNESS as a virtue

  • Aristotelian / Neo-Aristotelian strategy [MCDAVID’S CONCERNS]

    • Sphere: Leisure

    • Virtue: Playfulness

    • Vices? Not really, except in smaller characteristics

  • PLAYFULNESS as a virtue then has

    • Psychologically

      • Diposition that is stable across time and situations

      • Cognitive components where we rely on practical reason to deliberate about how to use leisure

      • Conative componets where we train our emotions to feel rightly

      • Mood components where positive mood can differentiate between good and bad types of play

    • Characteristically

      • Seriousness: becomes competent, stays committed [vs. flakiness & severity]

      • Creativity: learns the boundaries of something, but pushes them virtuously [vs. rigidity & unruliness]

      • Humility: fails virtuously when attempting novelty, innovation, exploration [vs. fragility & recklessness]

      • Optimism: sets expectations and goes after them [vs. naïveté]

      • Sociality: an awareness and interest in how leisure time affects others

    • Ethical Implications [VOLLBRECHT’S CONCERNS]

      • Leisure is necessary for a eudaimōn life

      • Playfulness helps us to regulate that sphere, uniquely and comprehensively

      • If we lack leisure, we are kakodaimōn

      • If we fail to develop playfulness, we might develop kakē or become kakodaimōn

  • Sphere: Leisure

  • Virtue: Playfulness

  • Vices? Not really, except in smaller characteristics

THANK YOU FOR YOUR TIME!

Freebies

PDF of the bulk of the theory: Chapter 4 from The Virtue of Playfulness

A YouTube playlist of me reading (clumsily, imperfectly) through the book

I’m also happy to put you in contact with Routledge for copies for review. Shoutout Rosaleah Stammler & Andrew Weckenmann.

I can send a PDF to anyone for review purposes, even for ratings on Amazon or GoodReads. Just email me at glenn.trujillo@louisville.edu

Re: McDavid

Possible questions:

1) Is what I’m really talking about playfulness?

2) Are there many types of playfulness?

Re: Vollbrecht

External goods and equitability

Sufficiency Thesis (e.g., as in Stoics): psychological goods are sufficient for [virtue OR happiness]

Egoism/Individualism Thesis (e.g., Stoics, Epicureans, Skeptics): [virtue, happiness OR justice] are only (primarily) issues of individual people

For me, Aristotle denies both of these theses.

Bigger question: Who bears the responsibility for failures in virtue, happiness, and justice?